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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plmntiff-Respondent,

vs.
ERSELL HARRIS,

Case No.

12998

Defendant-AppeUant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment and sentence
entered against the appellant in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, convicting him
of Fraudulent Use of a Credit Card.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried to a jury and convicted of the
crone of Fraudulent Use of a Credit Card on November
30. 1970. On January 5, 1971, Judge Joseph G. Jeppson
committed appellant to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term as provided by law.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court and a remarid for a new trial, or in the alternative resenttncing
of <.ippcllant on the lesser included misdemeanor.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Trial in the above-entitled matter was held on November 22, 1970. The State's witnE:ss Robert Rose testifiE'd that he was owner and operat01 of the Image (T.
1U2) and that on January 21, 1970, the defendant entered
hi~ shop (T. 104) in the company of Evelyn Davis (T.
104). Mr. Rose testified that Evelyn Davis used the
credit ca.rd at that time in the women's part of his shop
(T. 108), she then asked the defendant if there was anything he wanted (T. 108) and the defendant replied that
hp liked a suit in the window (T. }08). Mr. Rose testified that Evelyn Davis told the defendant to try it on
(T. 109), that the suit fit (T. 109) and that Evelyn Davis
s::tid "We will take it" (T. 109). Mr. Rose testified that
he then asked both of them how they were going to handle> it (T. 110) and Evelyn Davis replied that the purcha"C' would be on a credit ca.rd (T. 110).
The witness testified that Evelyn Davis handed him
the credit card (T. 111) and upon request showed him
additional forms of identification (T. 111). During this
time the defendant was standing at Evelyn Davis' side
(T. 111). Mr. Rose prepared a draft marked exhibit 2
(T. 112) and Evelyn Davis signed it with the name Lewis
Flowers (T. 117). Mr. Rose depo~ited the Bankameri-

card draft signed by Evelyn Davis on January 26, 1970
(T. 120, 121). The amount of tha purchase induding
sale' tax was $146.30 (T. 118). Mr. Rose testified that
thr value of the suit was $140.0U retail and between
$70.00 and $75.00 at cost (T. 120).
Mr. Rose testified that his stme had had dealings
with Evelyn Davis prior to the date of the offense (T.
127).

The State witness, Christine Richards testified that
on a date prior to the date of the offense (T. 132) she
had been in the employ of the Image (T. 132) and sold
a black woman a pants suit (T. 133) which had been
cJ:iarged upon the Bankamericard :dentified as Plaintiff's
E¥hibit 1 (T. 133).
The State's witness, Mr. Allen J. Hunsaker, testified
t'111t he was an assistant manager in the central operatirins department for First Security Bank (T. 140). He
further testified that the Image made a deposit of
$272.94 on January 26 (T. 141) which included the
$146.30 draft in the name "Flowers" (T. 144). The bank
nctified Mrs. Flowers through the mails of the $146.30
charge (T. 151) and that in this case he did not know
whether or not she had paid it (T. 151). The witness
testified that in the event Mrs. Flowers did not pay the
charge they would charge it back to the Image (T. 151,
lW), but that in this instance he did not know if this
had been done or not (T. 151) .
Mrs. Louise Flowers testified for the State that Ex-
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hibit 1 had been her credit card (T. 154), that she had
lost her purse with her card in it (T. 153) and that she
had not given anyone else permission to use the card (T.
151).
Mr. William Denning testified that on January 26
he was working at Mode-0-Day (T. 157), and that
Evelyn Davis again used the credit card marked Exhibit
1 (T. 158) and that at that time she was accompanied
by the defendant (T. 159).
The defendant took the stand and testified that on
JBnuary 21 he took Evelyn Davis downtown (T. 170)
and she bought him a suit at the Image (T. 173).
Counsel stipulated to take their exceptions to the
instructions while the jury was deliberating (T. 204).
The defendant's counsel took exception to instmction
5A (T. 206).
Defendant's counsel pointed out that the informaticn charged the defendant with obtaining "goods r.aving
a value in excess of $100.00" (T. 206). Defendant's
counsel further pointed out that the information charged
the defendant with obtaining "goods having a value in
excess of $100.00" (T. 206). Defendant's counsel iurther
pointed out that the statute, §76-20-8.1, Utah Code Annot8t.ed, (1953) requires "value or cost" in excess of $100.00
(T. 206). Defendant's counsel further complained that
"by putting in the word 'retail' in paragraph five, the
jury is left without the opportunity t.o make a determina·
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tio'.1 on the evidence as to the value of the item in question" (T. 206).
Defendant's counsel further pointed out that the
evidence was that "the cost to the merchant was $70.00"
(T 206). The defendant's counsel further stated that
"the question of value is crucial in this instance whereby
$100.00 is the line of demarcation between a misdemeanor
penc.lty and a felony penalty where the value of the
goorl~ could be found to be under $100.00" (T. 207) .
Defendant's counsel called the court's attention to
its requested instruction 5A (T-pagc between 31 and 32)
which used solely value as charged in the information and
as made unlawful in the statute (T. 207). Defendant's
proposed instruction 5A further allowed the jury the
opportunity of finding the defendant guilty of the lesser
included misdemeanor which the State's instruction did
not allow (T. 23) (T-page between 21 and 32).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE JURY INSTRUCTION GIVEN BY THE
COURT USED RETAIL VALUE RATHER
THAN SIMPLY VALUE AS CONTAINED
IN THE INFORMATION, THE STATUTE
AND THE DEFENSE'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION. FURTHER THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE COURT DID
NOT INCLUDE AN INSTRUCTION ON THE
LESSER INCLUDED FRAUDULENT USE

AS REQUESTED BY THE DEFENSE AND
INCLUDED IN THEIR PROPOSED lNSTRUCTION 5A. THE COURT BY THE INSTRUCTIONS THEY GAVE ELIMINATED
FROM THE JURY THE POSSIBILITY OF
THEIR FINDING THE DE FE ND AN 'r
GUILTY OF THE LESSER INCLUDED
FRAUDULENT USE PREJUDICING THE
DEFENDANT'S POSITION TO SUCH AN
EXTENT THAT THE TRIAL RESULTS
MUST BE CORRECTED BY THE UTAH
SUPREME COURT.
In State v. Pappacostas, 407 P. 2d 576, 17 Utah 2d
197 (1965) the Supreme Court of the State of Utah stated
"the determination of the facts should be scrupulously
left to the jury."
In Morris v. State, 491 P. 2d 784 (1971) the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated, "in a larceny prosecution
the value of the property stolen must be proven as a fact
and it is to be determined by the jury."
In People v. Lyarraga, 264 P. 2d 953, 122 C. A. 2d
436 (1954) and State v. Melrose, 470 P. 2d 552, 2 Wash.
App. 824 (1970) Washington and California also found
value determination as to petit or grand theft a question
for the jury.
In State v. Sorrell, 388 P. 2d 429, 95 Ariz. 220 (1964),
the court considered a case similar to the case at bar. In
that case testimony had been given as to both retail and
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wholesale value. The Arizona Court held that such prices
fix the range within which the jury may find fair market
value.
In California the code covering theft, West's Annotated Penal Code, §484, provides: "In determining the
value of the property obtained for the purposes of this
sEction, the reasonable and fair market value shall be
thr test." In People v. Renfro, 38 Cal. Rptr. 832, 250
C. A. 2d 921 (1967) the court four;.d replacement cost
to be the fair market value. The newly revised Utah
P2w~1 Code, §76-6-101 ( 4), Utah Code Annotated (1953),
seems to deiline value as the lesser of market value or
co:;t of replacement. In using such a definition the offense
in the case at bar would be a misdemeanor bas~d upon
the victim's statement that his wholesale cost on the item
taken was $70.00.
In State v. Close, 499 P. 2d 287, 28 Utah 2d 144
(1972) our Supreme Court considered the question of the
court's instruction on lesser included offenses. The Court
stated, "The well established general rule, that the jury
should be instructed on lesser included offenses when
such a conviction would be warranted by any reasonable
view of the evidence, is in accord with and supported by
our statutory law. §77-33-6, Utah Code Annotated (1953),
provides that 'The jury may find the defendant guilty of
any offense the commission of which is necessarily included in that with which he is charged in the indictment
or information, or of an attempt to commit the offense.' "
The Court listed ample Utah law on the question and
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then went on to find that the court must instruct on the
lesser included offense even in the absence of objection.
In the case at bar there was a request for such an instruction.
Earlier in State v. Gilli.am, 463 P. 2d 811, 23 Utah
2d 372 ( 1970) our Supreme Court overruled a first degree murder conviction where instructions for lesser included offenses had not been given, finding that the defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on lesser
included offenses "if any reasonable view of the evidence
would support such a verdict."
California held likewise in People v. Dewberry, 334
P. 2d 852, 51 C. 2d 548 (1959). The California Supreme
Court Justice Traynor writing the opinion held "That
when the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of
guilt of both the offense charged and a lesser included
offense, the jury must be instructed that if they entertain a reasonable doubt as to which offense has been
committed, they must find the defendant guilty only of
the lesser offense." Idaho held likewise in Cassey v. State,
429 P. 2d 836, 91 Idaho 706 (1967).
California's West Annotated Penal Code §1097 states
"When reasonable doubt as to degree he can be convicted
only of the lowest: When it appears that the defendant
has committed a public offense, and there is reasonable
ground of doubt in which of two or more degrees he is
guilty, he can be convicted of the lower of such degree
only." Idaho has a similar statute, Idaho Code, §19-2105.
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In State v. Fair, 456 P. 2d 168, 23 Utah 2d 34 (1966)
and State v. Tapp, 490 P. 2d 334, 26 Utah 2d 392 (1971)
our Supreme Court resolved questions as to applicable
sentence in favor of the defendants, stating in Tapp
"That in case of doubt or uncertainty as to the degree
of the crime, the defendant in a criminal case is entitled
to the lesser." The defendant in a criminal case in Utah
is given every benefit of the doubt as to finding of guilt,
degree of offense and sentence given upon conviction.
In the case at bar the court, by refusing to give the defendant's requested jury instruction 5A, did not avail the
defendant of an opportunity to receive a benefit of doubt.

CONCLUSION
Clearly under the law the appellant in the case at
bar was entitled at very least to 1) having the question
of value submitted to the jury without being limited to
"retail value" and 2) having the jury instructed as to the
lesser included misdemeanor offense in the event the jury
should find value to be less than $100.00. Since this was
not done the appellant's conviction must be reversed or
in the alternative the case must be remanded to the trial
court with instructions to resentence the appellant under
the lesser included misdemeanor.
Respectfully submitted,

JACK W. KUNKLER
Attorney for Appellant

